Prerogative legislation as the paradigm of bad law-making: The Chagos Islands by Cormacain, Ronan
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
School of Advanced Study 
University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ronan Cormacain 
 
Prerogative Legislation as the Paradigm of Bad Law-
Making: The Chagos Islands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LLM 2011-2012 
LLM in Advanced Legislative Studies (ALS) 
F1059 
 1
 
 
 
 
Prerogative Legislation as the 
Paradigm of Bad Law-Making: The 
Chagos Islands 
F1059 
 2
Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background ........................................................................... 3 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3 
Historical background ............................................................................................................ 3 
Legal Background .................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter 2 – Poor Quality Legislation .................................................................................... 6 
Clarity .................................................................................................................................... 6 
Precision ................................................................................................................................. 7 
Ambiguity .............................................................................................................................. 8 
Plain language ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Gender Neutral Language .................................................................................................... 10 
Misleading Title ................................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 3 – Inaccessible Law ............................................................................................... 15 
Importance of Accessibility ................................................................................................. 15 
Official UK position on promulgation of legislation ........................................................... 16 
Access to Chagos Island Legislation ................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 4 – Use of Prerogative Powers to Make Legislation ............................................ 20 
Source of Prerogative Power ............................................................................................... 20 
Nature, Extent and Justiciability of Legislative Prerogative Power .................................... 21 
Precedent for exercise of prerogative .................................................................................. 26 
Subservience of Prerogative Legislation to Parliamentary Legislation ............................... 27 
Extinguishment of Prerogative upon Establishment of Colonial Legislative Assembly ..... 30 
Repugnancy of Colonial Legislation to English Law .......................................................... 31 
Chapter 5 – Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 33 
Appendix – Copies of BIOT Gazette in British Law Libraries ........................................... 35 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 37 
Table of Cases ...................................................................................................................... 42 
Table of Legislation ............................................................................................................. 44 
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
BIOT  British Indian Ocean Territory 
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
 
 
 
F1059 
 3
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background 
 
Introduction 
The Chagos Islands, a British Overseas Territory, are a small archipelago of coral atolls in the 
Indian Ocean.  In 2004, Britain enacted the British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) 
Order 2004.  Section 9 prohibited the Chagossians from living in the Chagos Islands.  The 
2004 Order was made by way of Royal Prerogative, which means that it was made by the 
Crown by Order in Council, following the advice of the Privy Council.  In practice, this 
meant that it was made by the government without recourse to Parliament. The House of 
Lords ruled the 2004 Order valid in Bancoult (2).1   
The hypothesis of this essay is that the 2004 Order is bad law because it is low quality, 
inaccessible and ultra vires.  With regards to quality, I assess this by reference to Xanthaki’s 
criteria of quality in legislation. 2  For example, the Order is complex and uses archaic 
language. I also assess whether it can be called a ‘constitution’ under Elkin’s definition.3  
Turning next to inaccessibility, I assess whether BIOT legislation is accessible under 
Donelan’s definition of accessibility.4  I argue that the use of the Royal Prerogative meant 
that the Order was subject to minimal publicity. I also demonstrate the importance of 
accessibility by reference to judicial and academic opinion.  I carry out empirical research on 
the locations where BIOT legislation is to be found and supplement this by a Freedom of 
Information request to the FCO.   
Finally I argue that the Order is ultra vires the power of the Crown to make legislation for 
colonies.  There are five reasons for this, which all relate to the nature of the prerogative 
power to legislate for colonies.  (1) Prerogative legislation can only be made for peace, order 
and good government, and exile does not fall within this.  (2) There is no precedent for the 
prerogative being used in this way.  (3) The prerogative cannot subsist in the face of proper 
parliamentary legislation on the subject.  (4) The prerogative power to legislate is 
extinguished by the establishment of a colonial legislature.  (5) The 2004 Order is repugnant 
to Acts of Parliament. In order to prove this I analyse in detail the case law relating to the 
exercise of the prerogative. 
An anti-democratic theme underlies many of the other points made in this essay. The 2004 
Order is legislation without a legislature.  It was not voted upon or assented to by the British 
Parliament. It was not the subject of a referendum among the Chagossians.  It was not voted 
upon by any representatives of the Chagossians.  
Historical background 
At the outset, a word on nomenclature.  The Chagos Islands / Archipelago is the geographical 
name for the islands.  British Indian Ocean Territory is the name first used in 1965 to 
demarcate the islands as a political entity. Diego Garcia is the name of the largest island.  
Chagossians are the inhabitants. Ilois is the historic French / Creole name used to describe 
them (‘people of the islands’).   
                                                 
1 Bancoult v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 
2 Helen Xanthaki, ‘On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test’ in Constantin Stefanou 
and Helen Xanthaki (eds), Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach (Ashgate, 2008). 
3 Zachary Elkins et al, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
4 Edward Donelan, ‘European Approaches to Improving Access to and Managing the Stock of Legislation’ 
(2009) 30 SLR 147. 
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The Chagos Islands were originally part of Mauritius.5  In 1814, Mauritius was ceded by the 
French to the British.  By the 1960s the main economic activity on the islands was harvesting 
copra from coconut plantations. The population in the 1960s was low, between 829 and 
1,5006.  Some families had lived there for generations. 
Storm clouds began to gather in 1964 when the UK discussed establishing a US military base 
on Diego Garcia.  In 1965, the UK detached the islands from Mauritius.  Agreement on the 
base was reached between the US and the UK in 1966.  In 1967, the UK bought all land from 
the coconut plantation company.  In 1968, Mauritius became independent.  From 1968 to 
1971, the Chagossians left the islands.  Force was not used, although it was made clear to the 
islanders that there was to be neither employment nor supplies on the island.  The 
Chagossians moved to either Mauritius or the Seychelles.  Their lives in those places were 
bleak.  They were eventually paid a small amount of compensation. 
Every single British judge who has considered the conduct of the British government towards 
the Chagossians in that period has condemned it.  Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal said that  
 
What they have received has done little to repair the wrecking of their families and 
communities, to restore their self-respect or to make amends for the underhand 
official conduct now publicly revealed by the documentary record.7 
 
In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman stated ‘the removal and resettlement of the 
Chagossians was accomplished with a callous disregard of their interests’.8  Lord Rodger 
spoke of the ‘unhappy – indeed in many respects disgraceful – events of 40 years ago’.9  Lord 
Carswell spoke of ‘distress and indignation’.10 
The former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook called government action ‘sordid and morally 
indefensible’.11  Bruce Kent, co-founder of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament said ‘it is 
a story of ruthless military and economic imperialism, Cold War driven, and underpinned by 
servile British governments’.12  Tomkins said it raised ‘frankly grotesque issues of British 
colonial arrogance and high-handedness’.13 
From the 1970s onwards, the Chagossians made efforts to argue for their right to return to 
their homeland.  These were ultimately fruitless, although they were occasionally given 
permission for short visits, paid for by the British government.  They received some further 
compensation.  I attended a Freedom of Information Tribunal in London on 10/7/2012 at 
which Colin Roberts, Overseas Territories Director of the FCO stated in cross examination 
that ‘government policy is to prevent resettlement of BIOT’. 
 
                                                 
5 See further, David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the US Military Base at Diego Garcia 
(Princeton University Press, 2009). 
6 Adam Tomkins, ‘Magna Carta, Crown and Colonies’ (2001) PL 571, although Madeley puts it at up to 2000, 
John Madeley, Diego Garcia: A Contrast to the Falklands (Minority Rights Group Report No. 54, 1985). 
7 Bancoult (2) in the Court of Appeal. 
8 Bancoult (2), House of Lords [10]. 
9 ibid [75]. 
10 ibid [119]. 
11 Vine, 171. 
12 Bruce Kent, Book Review: Diego Garcia Island of Shame (2009) accessed at < 
http://www.intellidatasystems.com/bkcms/> on 2/8/2012. 
13 Tomkins, 572. 
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Legal Background 
Legislation authorised all government actions.  The Chagossians responded with litigation 
challenging the validity of the legislation (and concomitant government actions).  Some of 
this is digested below.  
 
British Indian Ocean Territories Order 1965 
This Order detached the Chagos Islands from Mauritius and established the British Indian 
Ocean Territories as a separate legal entity.  BIOT consisted of the Chagos Islands together 
with some other unconnected islands (which were ultimately transferred to the Seychelles).  It 
established a Commissioner with the power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
governance of the territory. 
 
Immigration Ordinance 1971 
This Ordinance was made under the 1965 Order.  Section 4(1) stated that ‘no person shall 
enter into the Territory ... or remain in the Territory’ without a permit.  It formed the legal 
basis for the exile of the Chagossians. 
 
Bancoult (1) 2000 
The Divisional Court in the UK gave a ruling in favour of the Chagossians.14  The court ruled 
that the Immigration Ordinance 1971 was void for being ultra vires. 
 
Immigration Ordinance 2000 
As soon as the judgement in Bancoult (1) was made, the government enacted the Immigration 
Ordinance 2000.  This was largely the same as the 1971 Ordinance except that the 
prohibitions on entry did not apply to Chagossians ie they were legally entitled to move to the 
Chagos Islands (other than Diego Garcia). 
 
British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order 2004, British Indian Ocean Territory 
(Immigration) Order 2004 
These Orders were made in the face of suspected attempts by the Chagossians to launch a 
protest flotilla to land on the islands.  They reversed the Immigration Ordinance 2000.  Both 
Orders were made under the Royal Prerogative.  The Constitution Order is the key Order and 
section 9 is the key provision.  It states: 
 
No right of abode in the Territory 
9. –  (1) Whereas the Territory was constituted and is set aside to be available 
for the defence purposes of the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Government of the United States of America, no person has the right of abode in the 
Territory. 
 (2) Accordingly, no person is entitled to enter or be present in the 
Territory except as authorised by or under this Order or any other law for the time 
being in force in the Territory. 
 
Bancoult (2) 2008 
The Chagossians commenced litigation against the 2004 Order.  They were successful at the 
Divisional Court15 and at the Court of Appeal.16  However, their case was rejected by the 
House of Lords and the 2004 Order held to be valid.17 
                                                 
14 Bancoult v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2001] QB 1067. 
15 [2006] EWHC 1038 (Admin). 
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Chapter 2 – Poor Quality Legislation 
 
Xanthaki sets out useful criteria for assessing the quality of legislation.18  In this chapter, I 
assess the quality of the 2004 Order by reference to what may be termed her ‘technical’ 
drafting criteria (technical in the sense that they relate solely to the words on the page, not the 
broader aspects of quality).  These are that legislation should be clear, precise and 
unambiguous.  At a lower level of importance in Xanthaki’s hierarchy, legislation should be 
written in plain and gender neutral language.  This chapter also argues that the very title of 
the Order represents, in microcosm, its poor quality. 
Clarity 
Clarity means that legislation should be readily understandable.  Citizens should be able to 
read it and quickly grasp its meaning.  Butt condemned traditional drafting styles which ‘ooze 
archaic language, complex grammatical structures and sentences of excruciating length’.19  
Bennion advocates simplicity, which means ‘to put into a form which is as clear (that is 
intelligible and free from elaboration) to the intended reader as is practicable’.20  Lord Simon 
argued that ‘people who live under the Rule of Law are entitled to claim that law should be 
intelligible’.21 Dickerson states that ‘the importance of clarity to statutes needs little urging’.22  
In Canada, the drafters take pride in the clarity of their legislation.23 
The 2004 Order is not clear.  Many of its provisions stretch on for lines and lines of text.  
Take section 3(2)(a) for example.  It is 117 words long (not counting the additional words 
contained in paragraph (b)).  It may be legally precise, but it borders on unintelligibility.  It 
reads as follows: 
 
(2)  Without prejudice to the generality of sections 15, 16 and 17 of the 
Interpretation Act 1978 (as applied by section 2(1) of this Order) – 
 
(a) the revocation of the existing Orders does not affect the continuing 
operation of any law made, or having effect as if made, under the 
existing Orders and having effect as part of the law of the Territory 
immediately before the commencement of this Order, but any such law 
shall thereafter, without prejudice to its amendment or repeal by any 
authority competent in that behalf, shall have effect as if made under 
this Order and be construed with such modifications, adaptations, 
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into 
conformity with this Order, 
 
After carefully parsing this provision, I take it to mean two things.  Firstly, that existing laws 
continue in operation after the 2004 Order is made.  Secondly, that existing laws are to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 [2008] QB 365. 
17 [2008] UKHL 61. 
18 Xanthaki (n 2). 
19 Peter Butt, ‘Modern Legal Drafting’ (2002) 23 SLR 12. 
20 Francis Bennion, ‘The Readership of Legal Texts’ (1993) 27 April, Clarity 1. 
21 Lord Simon, ‘The Renton Report – Ten Years On’ (1985) SLR 133. 
22 Reed Dickerson, ‘The Diseases of Legislative Language’ (1964) 1 Harv J on Legis 5, 5. 
23 Peter Johnson, ‘Legislative Drafting Practices and Other Factors Affecting the Clarity of Canada’s Laws’ 
(1991) 12 SLR 1. 
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treated as if they had been made under the 2004 Order.  This could be redrafted more simply 
as – 
 
(2) The revocation of the existing Orders does not affect the validity of any law 
made under those Orders. 
 
(3) But any law made under the existing Orders has effect as if it were made 
under this Order. 
 
This redrafting follows Del Duca’s exhortation that ‘the goal of simplification is to say 
exactly the same thing as the original but in simplified understandable language’.24 
 
Another barrier to clarity is superfluous words or phrases.  For example, section 2(2) sets out 
definitions to be used ‘unless the contrary intention appears’.  Nowhere in the Order does a 
contrary intention appear.  This form of words in a definition provision is a classic drafting 
technique, but it is meaningless in this context – a ritual incanted to give weight, but lacking 
in substance. 
Further superfluities exist.  Section 3(2) refers to the Interpretation Act ‘as applied by section 
2(1) of this Order’.  This adds nothing.  As section 2 applied the Act, repetition in s. 3 is 
valueless. 
Section 10 is ‘subject to the provisions of this Order’.  Again, this is verbiage.  The Order is a 
single document, a single law to be read as a coherent whole.  Every provision is subject to 
every other provision anyway.  The phrase is redundant. 
Other prerogative legislation suffers similar deficiencies.  Some use textual amendments 
which are terse to the point that the reader can have no idea as to what change is being made 
or what the new law is, for example the Diplomatic Service (Amendment) Order 2009.  
 
Precision 
Precision means that legislation should have exact and precise boundaries.  Christie makes an 
argument for open-textured or vague law, but I disagree.25  Readers need to know exactly 
what is lawful and unlawful.  The Renton Report even put precision as more important than 
simplicity – ‘the draftsman must never be forced to sacrifice certainty for simplicity’.26  The 
US Supreme Court stated that ‘it is a basic principle of due process than an enactment is void 
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined’.27  
The 2004 Order is littered with vague provisions. 
Section 2(1) states that the Interpretation Act 1978 applies to the Order with ‘the necessary 
modifications’ but does not specify what those modifications are.  Section 3 talks of 
‘modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary’ to other laws, 
again without specifying what those are.  Even beyond the vagueness, there is an internal 
inconsistency – is the 1978 Act only subject to modifications but not adaptations, 
qualifications and exceptions? It is unclear if a difference of meaning is intended.  
Section 3(1) revokes the ‘British Indian Ocean Territory Orders 1976 to 1994’.  There is a 
footnote to the reference number of one statutory instrument, a reference to a page number 
(of an unspecified book) and the name of a 3rd Order.  This is not precise.  If legislation is to 
                                                 
24 Louis Del Duca, ‘Is it Time for a Model Set of Drafting Principles’ (2000 – 01) 105 Dick L Rev 205, 207. 
25 George Christie, ‘Vagueness and Legal Language’ (1963-64) Minn L Rev 885. 
26 Report of the Renton Committee on the Preparation of Legislation (1975, Cmnd. 6053), paragraph 11.5. 
27 Grayned v Rockford 408 US 104, 108 (1972) 
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be revoked, the precise name and reference number of all legislation to be revoked should be 
specified.  Instead, the Order has a garbled mixture of numbers and text. 
Section 7 allows the Commissioner to terminate appointments ‘as the Commissioner may 
think fit’.  This is not a precise law: it is an invitation to administrative capriciousness.  
Hewart criticised this practice of giving wide administrative discretion to officials as being 
contrary to the rule of law.28 
 
Ambiguity 
Legislation is unambiguous if it can only have one meaning.  Fraser argues that it is 
sometimes better to have ambiguity in law to allow for space for political debate.29  Although 
this may hold true in politics, I profoundly disagree when it comes to legislation.  The law 
should only admit to one meaning.  Gobbi argues that if a statute is ambiguous, one can look 
to international treaties on the subject,30 but in my view, the better starting point is to avoid 
ambiguity in the first place. 
Once again, the 2004 Order fails when measured against this criterion.   
Section 4 is entitled ‘Establishment of office of Commissioner’ and commences with ‘there 
shall be a Commissioner’. The difficulty is that there is already a Commissioner for the 
Territory, originally established by the 1965 Order.  Is there meant to be continuity between 
these Commissioners, or are they completely different entities?  Does it actually mean ‘there 
shall continue to be a Commissioner’?31  The Order is ambiguous, although the fact that 
Anthony Campbell Crombie remained in post as Commissioner before and after the Order 
commenced indicates that the Order intended there to be continuity.32 
The same point pertains with the Official Stamp in section 6 of the 2004 Order.  That section 
provides that ‘there shall be an Official Stamp’.  Does it mean that ‘there shall continue to be 
an Official Stamp’? Or should the old stamp under the 1965 Order be destroyed? 
There is further ambiguity in section 5 when it comes to describing what the Commissioner 
does. Sometimes it is ‘powers and duties’, or ‘other functions’, or ‘do and execute all things’.  
Section 8, when describing other office holders mentions ‘functions attaching to office’.  
Once again, this is ambiguous.  Using a single term like ‘functions’ is clear, but confusion 
arises once different terms are introduced. 
Section 8 also introduces the concept (without definition) of ‘substantive holder’ of an office.  
Section 4(2) mentions the officer holder and someone who many temporarily be designated 
as an office holder.  Is ‘substantive holder’ meant to include the first category but not the 
second? 
Throughout the 2004 Order, the Crown is empowered to do things.  Sometimes the provision 
empowering the Crown includes the phrase ‘through a Secretary of State’, but on other 
occasions, the power does not include this qualification.  Lack of consistency is a classic 
example of ambiguity.  When the Crown disallows a law under section 11, this must be done 
through a Secretary of State.  But when the Crown pardons a person under section 12, it 
could be read as the Crown’s sole decision. 
Finally, under s. 4, the Commissioner ‘holds’ office, but under s. 15(3) a public officer may 
hold or ‘act’ in an office.  It appears that the Commissioner holds office but does not act in 
that office.  In practice, that cannot be correct. 
                                                 
28 Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (Ernest Benn, 1929). 
29 Graham Fraser, ‘In Praise of Ambiguity’ (2000) Jan – Feb Policy Options 21. 
30 Mark Gobbi, ‘Making sense of Ambiguity: Some Reflections on the use of Treaties to Interpret Legislation in 
New Zealand’ (2002) 23 SLR 47. 
31 For example, ‘there shall continue to be a registrar of companies’ s. 1060 Companies Act 2006. 
32 See List of Commissioners of BIOT on <www.worldstatesmen.org> accessed 3/8/2012. 
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Plain Language 
Eagleson described plain language as ‘clear, straightforward expression, using only as many 
words as are necessary.  It is language that avoids obscurity, inflated vocabulary and 
convoluted sentence structure’.33  Kimble advocates its use in legislation34 as does Thomas.35 
Watson-Brown thinks plain language is simply another tool in the drafter’s age-old struggle 
to create intelligible legislation.36  Sullivan wants to make the statute book more accessible 
by using plain language.37  Tanner concluded that plain language techniques make legislation 
more intelligible.38  Mowat recommended a ‘massive rewriting of old laws and a consistent 
commitment to plain language drafting of new legislation’.39 
Turnbull makes specific suggestions on plain language techniques to improve the quality of a 
draft.40  Without repeating the entirety of his list here, I set out below the most egregious 
breaches of his guidelines in the 2004 Order. 
The most obvious deficiency has already been mentioned in the context of clarity – long 
sentences. Short sentences are one of the most basic of plain language techniques and the 
2004 Order fails dismally in this regard.  I have already mentioned s. 3(2)(a) weighing in at 
117 words.  Section 15(2) is 130 words long.  These are paragraphs masquerading as 
sentences.  In an Order only 15 sections long, 18 sentences contain more than 50 words.  The 
second paragraph of The Picture of Dorian Grey is a single sentence 119 words long.41  Oscar 
Wilde can pull this off: drafters can’t. 
A second plain language deficiency in the 2004 Order is in the use of archaic language.  The 
following table sets out the instances of archaic words. 
 
Word Occurrences 
forthwith 1 
thereto 1 
thereafter 5 
thereof 1 
therewith 1 
whereon 1 
hereby 5 
 
Having read through the recent annual volumes of statutory instruments, no prerogative order 
commences ‘immediately’ they all commence ‘forthwith’.  See for example the Public 
Appointmments (Amendment) Order 2009.  
The third plain language deficiency is not as pronounced – it is dividing up provisions using 
numbered lists.  The Order does divide up sections into subsections and paragraphs.  
However, there is scope for more to be done.  For example, section 10(2) deals with the 
validity of laws made by the Commissioner.  It is 107 words long and concludes with 4 
                                                 
33 Robert Eagleson, Writing in Plain Language (Commonwealth of Australia, 1990). 
34 Joseph Kimble, ‘Answering the Critics of Plain Language’ (Plain Language Association International, 2003). 
35 Richard Thomas, ‘Plain English and the Law’ (1985) SLR 139. 
36 Anthony Watson-Brown, ‘Defining “Plain English” as an Aid to Legal Drafting’ (2009) 30 SLR 85. 
37 Ruth Sullivan, ‘Implications of Plain Language Drafting’ (2000) 22 SLR 145. 
38 Edwin Tanner, ‘Legislating to Communicate: Trends in Drafting Commonwealth Legislation’ (2002) 24 
Sydney L Rev 529. 
39 Christine Mowat, A Plain Language Handbook for Legal Writers (Carswell, 1998) 79. 
40 Mark Turnbull, ‘Clear Legislative Drafting: New Approaches in Australia’ (1990) 11 SLR 161. 
41 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Grey (Penguin Classics, 2006). 
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grounds on which a law may be invalid.  Unfortunately these four grounds are in a long line 
of text divided only by 3 ‘ors’.  The provision would read much better if a numbered list was 
used, ie each ground was numbered (a), (b), (c) and (d), and each ground started on a fresh 
line. 
A fourth plain language deficiency is one which is not as readily obvious.  Turnbull suggests 
keeping related words together.  Watson-Brown is more specific.  He was concerned with 
provisions which set out a rule and a set of conditions which must be satisfied before the rule 
is to be used.  His plain language suggestion is to avoid ‘front-loading’ conditions ie to 
clearly state the rule first, and then state the conditions after.  If the provision meanders 
through several conditions before reaching the rule, the reader can easily lose the narrative 
thread of the provision.  As Cormacain opines ‘It is difficult for readers to link the first part 
of the sentence to the last part of the sentence if they have to push their way through four 
conditions in the interim’.42  Mackinlay refers to this more technically as ‘syntactic 
discontinuity’ – deliberate separation of two elements of the same phrase by insertion of 
another clause between them.43  
This kind of syntactic discontinuity is present in section 7.  Section 7 empowers the 
Commissioner to do 3 things: (a) create offices, (b) make appointments to those offices, and 
(c) terminate those appointments.  However, before reaching the second and third power, the 
reader must first get though the conditions of ‘subject to the provisions of any law for the 
time being in force in the Territory and to such instructions as may from time to time be 
given to him by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State’.  The better plain language 
approach would be to first state the power and then to separately state the conditions for 
exercise of that power.  Similarly, in section 14, the reader must get through 40 words before 
discovering the point of the section (that the Commissioner can sell land).  The first 40 words 
deal with pre-conditions for this exercise of power. 
One final instance of a plain language deficiency is poor organisation.  Turnbull suggests that 
legislation should have coherence.  In a seminal book on drafting, Lord Thring’s fourth 
golden rule includes a requirement that temporary provisions should be separated and placed 
by themselves under separate headings.44  Transitional provisions are temporary provisions 
which govern the change from an old system to the new system.  Thornton’s advice is that 
‘such provisions may be important but they are of temporary concern and should not be 
scattered about in the substantive provisions’.45  Unfortunately, section 13(2) of the 2004 
contravenes this.  Alongside powers of the Chief Justice to direct the court to sit in the UK, 
are provisions on cases which started before commencement of the Order but are to be heard 
after commencement – this kind of transitional provision should be in a schedule.   
 
Gender Neutral Language 
Legislation is gender neutral if it formally and substantively applies equally to all genders. 
This essay does not seek to weigh up the arguments for and against gender neutral drafting.  
Rather, it proceeds on the basis that gender neutral drafting is a good thing.  There is nothing 
radical in this.  Schweikart supports it.46  In Australia it is argued that sexist language 
                                                 
42 Ronan Cormacain, ‘A Plain Language Case Study: Business Tenancies (Northern Ireland) Order 1996’ (2012) 
The Loophole 33, 40. 
43 Jana Mackinlay, ‘Syntactic Discontinuity in the Language of UK and EU Legislation’ accessed at 
<http://www.esp-world.info/index.html> on 1/8/2012. 
44 Henry Thring, Practical Legislation: The Composition and Language of Acts of Parliament and Business 
Documents (John Murrary, 1902) 42. 
45 G Thornton, Legislative Drafting (Butterworths , 4th edition, 1996) 385. 
46 Debora Schweikart, ‘Gender Neutral Pronoun Redefined’ (1998-99) 20 Women’s Rts L Rep 1. 
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denigrates women.47  Hill argues in favour of gender neutral language in court.48  For 
Petersson the case for gender neutral language is so strong that she argues that old statutes 
should be revised to strip them of gendered language.49 
This is not a dry esoteric point, it has a real impact on everyday life. In Bebb v Law Society50  
it was argued that a woman was entitled to be admitted as a solicitor as a woman was a 
‘person’ within the meaning of the law.  The actual ruling of the Court of Appeal was that a 
woman was not a ‘person’.51 
The 2004 Order is not gender neutral.  References to the Commissioner are to ‘he’ and ‘his’ 
powers.  The masculine is also used to refer to public officers.  Basic gender neutral drafting 
techniques could solve these problems.  Even the classical references to ‘Her Majesty’ can be 
made gender neutral by the simple expedient, used in New Zealand legislation, of referring 
instead to ‘the Crown’. 
 
Misleading Title 
There are two objections to the title British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order.  
Firstly, ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ is disingenuous.  Secondly, the Order isn’t a 
constitution. 
An Act’s title should reflect its contents.  In researching the use of personalised Bill titles, 
Jones quotes a drafter as saying that ‘a short title is meant to be a description of what is in the 
Bill’.52  The title should be sober and neutral, not tendentious or controversial.  In Scotland 
this is mandated by Standing Orders of the Scottish Parliament: 
 
The text of a Bill – including both its short and long titles – should be in neutral terms 
and should not contain material that is intended to promote or justify the policy 
behind the Bill, or to explain its effect.53 
 
‘British Indian Ocean Territory’  
In the indexes of the digested cases from Mauritius before BIOT was detached from it in 
1965, there is no reference to an entity called BIOT. 54  The term BIOT didn’t exist before 
1965.  Britain is responsible for 13 other Overseas Territories: 
 
• Anguilla 
• British Antarctic Territory 
• Bermuda 
• British Virgin Islands 
                                                 
47 Unknown, ‘Avoidance of Sexist Language in Legislation’ (1985) 11 Commw L Bull 590. 
48 William Hill, ‘A Need for the Use of Non-Sexist Language in the Courts’ (1992) 49 Wash and Lee L Rev 
275. 
49 S Petersson, ‘Gender Neutral Drafting: Recent Commonwealth Developments’ (1990) 20 SLR 35. 
50 [1914] 1 Ch 286. 
51 Rosemary Auchmuty, ‘Whatever happened to Miss Bebb? The Law Society and Women’s Legal History’ 
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52 Brian Jones, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on Humanised Public Law Campaigns: Personalising and 
Depersonalising the Legislative Process’ (2012) 6 Legisprudence 57,70. 
53 Section 9.2.3. 
54 W Greene, Digest of the Reported Criminal Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Mauritius 1843 -1883 
(Port Louis, 1884), L Hughes, Digest of the Reported Decisions of the Supreme Court of Mauritius 1861-1901 
(Central Printing Establishment, 1905), G Nairac, Digest of the Mauritius Law Reports 1902-1925 (PG 
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• Cayman Islands 
• Falkland Islands 
• Gibraltar 
• Montserrat 
• Pitcairn Island 
• St Helena, Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha 
• South Georgia and Sandwich Islands 
• Sovereign Base Area on Cyprus 
 
BIOT is an artificial construct.  ‘Chagos Islands’ is precise and geographically accurate.  
BIOT is vague and insipid.  Furthermore, BIOT gives the impression of some remote, 
unoccupied land, untouched by human hand and unnamed by human tongue.  The only 
similarly named Overseas Territory is British Antarctic Territory – a place with no permanent 
inhabitants.  Chagos Islands are peopled by Chagossians, but there is no obvious noun to 
describe the people who belong to BIOT. 
It might be thought that this argument is a fanciful conspiracy theory.  However, the 
propaganda drive of the UK when making the original 1965 Order was express (although 
covert).  The government of the day deliberately misrepresented the facts to the outside 
world, pretending that the islands were only inhabited by a few migrant labourers.  Vines 
cites the following comments by various senior British officials – 
 
‘The legal position of the inhabitants would be greatly simplified from our point of 
view – though not necessarily from theirs – if we decided to treat them as a floating 
population.’ 
‘This device, though rather transparent, would at least give us a defensible position.’ 
‘To certify, more or less fraudulently [the Chagossians] as belonging to somewhere 
else.’55 
 
This disingenuous approach is not limited to the colonial past.  On 15 June 2004, the Under-
Secretary of State for the FCO, Bill Rammell informed Parliament of developments in BIOT. 
He referred to the Chagossians who ‘were in due course relocated to Mauritius and 
Seychelles, from where they or their families originated’.56  This isn’t actually a lie, but it 
certainly is misleading.  ‘Relocation’ is a euphemism for the more accurate exiled / tricked / 
intimidated.  A grandparent may have ‘originated’ in Mauritius, but many of the Chagossians 
were born and bred in the Chagos Islands.  David Snoxell was the British High 
Commissioner to Mauritius when the 2004 Order was made, he described the actions of his 
own government as ‘three decades of dissimulation and subterfuge’.57 
Calling the Chagos Islands BIOT is as disingenuous as calling the UK the Eastern Atlantic 
Archipelago and as propagandist as naming it Airstrip One.58 
 
‘Constitution’ 
Finer describes constitutions as  
 
                                                 
55 Vine, 91 for all quotes. 
56 Written Ministerial Statement 15 June 2004, col 32WS. 
57 ‘Political Context (the Bancoult case) and Possible Solutions’ (Colloquium: The Common Law, the Royal 
Prerogative and Executive Legislation, fCambridge, 19/1/2008). 
58 George Orwell, 1984 (Secker & Warburg, 1949). 
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Codes of rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and duties 
among the various agencies and offices of government, and define the relationship 
between these and the public.59 
 
Elkins sets out three purposes of constitutions: 
 
1. Limit the behaviour of government. 
2. The symbolic function of defining the nation and its goals. 
3. Defining patterns of authority and setting up government institutions.60 
 
The 2004 Order does fulfil the third purpose as it does set out executive, legislative and 
judicial power structures. 
The 2004 Order fails absolutely at the first purpose.  This purpose can be traced back at least 
as far to Thomas Paine who said that the fundamental function of a constitution is to restrain 
government.61  The Order does not grant rights to people over government, it simply exiles 
the people.  Not quite Lincoln’s paradigm of  ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’62, 
rather it is government against the people.  Another American perspective on British colonial 
constitutions is that ‘Britain’s history with its colonies shows it can and does sweep away 
rights when it is convenient’.63  Plender stated that ‘A significant number of modern national 
constitutions characterise the right to enter one’s country as a fundamental or human right’.64  
But the only part of the ‘constitution’ which deals with human rights takes them away rather 
than protects them.  As Lord Mance said ‘a constitution which exiles a territory’s inhabitants 
is a contradiction in terms’.65 
The Order also fails at the second purpose.  Murphy paraphrases this purpose thus, that it 
‘serves as a binding statement of a people’s aspiration for themselves as a nation’.66  There is 
nothing in the 2004 Order which is uplifting or aspirational.  Instead, there is the terse 
statement in section 9 that the territory was ‘constituted and set aside for the defence 
purposes of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States 
of America’.  This is not a preamble but ‘an apologia’.67  In addition, the apologia is simply 
wrong, as the former British High Commissioner to Mauritius said, ‘I have never seen a 
convincing explanation as to why limited resettlement of UK nationals, on the Outer Islands, 
would pose a threat to the security of the base [Diego Garcia], 150 miles away’.68   
Not only does the 2004 Order fail as a constitution by the external standards set out above, it 
also fails by the government’s own standards.  Hendry and Dickson are two lawyers at the 
FCO.  In their book, they state that  
 
                                                 
59 S Finer, Five Constitutions (Humanities Press, 1979) 15. 
60 Elkins, (n 3). 
61 Common Sense and Other Writings (Modern Library, 2003) 
62 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, 1863. 
63 Michael Eshelman, ‘New Pitcairn Islands Constitution: Strong, Empty Words for Britain’s Smallest Colony’ 
(2012) 24 Pace Int’l L Rev 21, 23. 
64 Richard Plender, International Migration Law (2nd edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 135. 
65 Bancoult (2) [157]. 
66 W Murphy, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy’ in Douglas Greenberg et al (eds) 
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
67 Bancoult (2) [150]. 
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The policy of the UK Government has been to seek evidence of popular acceptance in 
the territory of a politically agreed [constitutional] text, whether by resolution of the 
locally elected body, by referendum, or by less formal means of public consultation.69 
 
Far from being consulted, the Chagossians were kept in the dark about their forthcoming 
exile from their homeland. 
The UK government discussed human rights in Overseas Territories and stated in a White 
Paper that ‘Overseas Territories legislation should comply with the same international 
obligations to which Britain is subject, such as the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’.70  Hendry and Dickson 
discuss the White Paper and state that ‘the UK’s position was that it would not agree to a new 
territory constitution which did not contain a fundamental rights chapter’.71 Although this 
was true for the constitutions of the Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, St Helena, Ascension 
and Tristan da Cunha, Pitcairn, Falkland Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Gibraltar and 
Montserrat, it isn’t true for the Chagos Islands. 
Contrast the treatment of the Chagos Islands with the treatment of Mauritius.  The UK, by 
Order in Council under the Royal Prerogative, gave Mauritius a constitution in the Mauritius 
Independence Order 1968.  That 1968 Constitution does comply with the requirements set out 
by Finer and Elkins.  It commences with the phrase that ‘Mauritius shall be a sovereign 
democratic state’and continues with ‘the right of the individual to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the protection of the law’.  There are 17 sections in the chapter entitled 
‘protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual’. There are chapters on 
citizenship, parliament, the executive, the judicature, the public service, the ombudsman and 
finance.  That constitution is 122 sections long.  It bears no comparison to the purported 
constitution contained in the 2004 Order.  As Finer notes ‘some [constitutions] are never 
meant to be taken seriously’.72   
 
 
                                                 
69 Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson, British Overseas Territory Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 31. 
70 Partnership for Progress and Prosperity: Britain and the Overseas Territories (Cm 4264, 1999). 
71 Hendry and Dickson, 151. 
72 S Finer et al, Comparing Constitutions (Clarendon Press, 1995) 6. 
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Chapter 3 – Inaccessible Law 
 
Importance of Accessibility 
Donelan defines accessibility – ‘in the context of legislation, means that it is easy to access 
online or in published texts’.73   
Accessibility is important for many reasons.  Firstly, it is a fundamental component of the 
rule of law, ‘the acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a 
citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance 
what are the legal consequences that will flow from it’.74  Secondly, it is elementary fairness 
that people are told of the rules they are expected to obey.  Thirdly, it grants democratic 
legitimacy to law.  Carr said that laws should be published ‘so that the public, in being 
informed of its ante-natal opportunity to criticise and the place where copies of the proposed 
rules can be obtained, is indirectly informed that legislation is impending’.75  Fourthly, it acts 
as a check upon executive abuse of power.  Ronald, discussing executive legislation, regarded 
‘publicity as a safeguard for holding the rule-making officials in check’.76  Finally, in 
practical terms, it increases the chance of a law being obeyed. 
In elucidating the meaning of the rule of law, Bingham begins with ‘accessibility of the 
law’.77  Greenberg says that ‘it is of enormous importance that laws are made accessible to 
the public as soon as possible’.78  The European Court of Human Rights stated that ‘the law 
must be adequately accessible’.79  In Australia, Gleeson said that ‘the content of the law must 
be adequately accessible’.80  In the European Union, the same point is made by Donelan ‘all 
participants in a society, an economy or government need to be able to find the legislation’.81  
The SIGMA initiative reinforces this point for Europe – ‘a principal aim of legislation is to 
enable those affected by it to organise and regulate their activities in accordance with its 
normative requirements … ready access to that legislation is a necessary concomitant’.82  The 
courts in Canada take the same view ‘to bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he has 
no means of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny’.83  Canadian drafter Keyes agrees, ‘if the 
law is to command respect and function as it is intended, it must be adequately 
promulgated’.84 
In New Zealand, the subject is of such importance that the government created the Public 
Access to Legislation project.85  Anthony says this was done ‘to improve the way in which 
New Zealand legislation is made available to the public’.86 
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The specific issue of access to legislation has come before the UK courts twice recently.  In R 
v Chambers 87 the defendant only avoided a criminal conviction when it was realised, at the 
last moment, that he was being prosecuted under a long-revoked law.  The court found it 
troubling that the case had advanced so far on foundations of straw.  It bemoaned the fact that 
‘there is no comprehensive statute law database with hyperlinks which would enable an 
intelligent person, by using a search engine, to find out all the legislation on a subject’.88 
The legislation in that case was at least available online, albeit that it was lost amidst a welter 
of other regulations.  The issue in ZL and VL was more concerned with the lack of 
publication of the statute.89  An Act received Royal Assent on 7 November 2002 and came 
into force immediately.  Before being printed on the 28 November, the government attempted 
to use the Act against ZL and VL. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the government – 
‘it is beyond argument that an Act of Parliament takes legal effect on the giving of Royal 
Assent, irrespective of publication’.90  However, the court was critical of the government’s 
approach and warned that it was not guaranteed of success the next time.  It left open the 
question on ‘a consideration of the validity of the exercise of executive powers which invade 
a Convention right in reliance on an inaccessible law’.91 
 
Official UK Position on Promulgation of Legislation 
What then is the official position in the UK on the promulgation of legislation?  Greenberg 
cites two parliamentary statements on the subject.  Firstly, the Attorney General  
 
The Lord Chancellor recognises that he has a responsibility, on behalf of the 
government, to ensure that satisfactory arrangements are made for the publication of 
the statute book, in order that the citizen may know by what laws he is bound.92 
 
Secondly, in response to the ZL case, the House of Lords stated that ‘all Acts are published 
simultaneously on the internet and in print as soon as possible after Royal Assent’.93 
It is more difficult to ascertain the official position on promulgation of prerogative 
legislation.  Greenberg states that it is available from two sources.  Firstly, as prerogative 
orders are made on the advice of the Privy Council ‘they are however readily available from 
the Privy Council’.94  Secondly, even though they aren’t statutory instruments within the 
meaning of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, ‘some are also printed at the end of the 
annual volumes of statutory instruments published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.’95  In 
correspondence, the Statutory Publications Office in Northern Ireland have stated that 
prerogative orders relating to Northern Ireland are also included in the annual volumes of 
Statutory Rules, even though they aren’t actually statutory rules within the meaning of the 
Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979.96 
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Access to Chagos Island Legislation 
It is immediately obvious to anyone researching Chagos Island legislation that it is extremely 
difficult to access.  Tomkins describes it as ‘unaccountable, indeed wholly secret rule-
making’.97   
There is no official website with authoritative copies of the legislation.  The official 
government website for legislation has a small number of BIOT statutes, but none made 
under the Royal Prerogative (and the prerogative orders, including the 2004 Order are the key 
texts).  The FCO, as the official government body responsible for Overseas Territories don’t 
have the 2004 Order on its website.  National Archives have some BIOT Gazettes (see further 
below), but none from 1990 onwards.98  Although Greenberg suggests that prerogative orders 
are readily available from the Privy Council, the reality is not quite as rosy.  In 
correspondence, the Privy Council stated that  
 
On our website Privy Council meetings from June 2010 include links to the full texts 
of Orders made that are not otherwise published on the legislation.gov.uk website.  
Unfortunately we do not have the staff resources to do this retrospectively, and 
inquirers are advised to contact us direct if they require copies.99 
 
If one knows the date an order is made, the Privy Council will promptly send it out.  
However, if one doesn’t know the date and name of an order and is just doing a generalised 
search, it is difficult to get anything. 
The other source that Greenberg gives as a possibility is the annual volume of statutory rules.  
Again, this draws a blank for BIOT prerogative Orders.  The 2004 volume of statutory 
instruments is 10,236 pages long.  It doesn’t contain the 2004 Order.  There are some entries 
relating to Overseas Territories, but these relate to ‘proper’ statutory instruments ie those 
made in the proper way under the authority of (and subject to the scrutiny of) parliament.  
The original 1965 Order likewise doesn’t appear in the 1965 volume of statutory instruments.  
In fact, it is noticeable by its absence, as the 1965 volume does contain other prerogative 
orders in council.  For example, it has the Royal Instructions relating to BIOT, as well as 
prerogative orders relating to Fiji, Basutoland and Mauritius. 
I submitted a request to the FCO under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 on 11/7/2012.  
The request concerned promulgation of BIOT legislation.  In response the FCO claimed that 
Freedom of Information did not extend to Chagos Islands and that therefore they were not 
bound to answer any questions.  This is in spite of the fact that BIOT legislation is made by 
the Queen, in right of the United Kingdom, in the United Kingdom after being drafted in the 
United Kingdom by United Kingdom civil servants.  To give credit to the FCO, they did 
provide me with some information on a concessionary basis. 
The one place that BIOT legislation is published is in the British Indian Ocean Territory 
Gazette.  Once again, the Gazette isn’t available online.  According to the FOI response from 
the FCO, the current total global distribution list of the Gazette is 20.  Of these, 16 go to an 
emanation of the government.  The remaining 4 on the list are all British law libraries: The 
British Legal Library, Bodleian Law Library, Squire Law Library and the Library at the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies.  One copy does go to Mauritius, but it is to the British 
High Commission there.   
Richard Dunne and I have catalogued the holdings at these libraries other than the Bodleian.  
The results are set out in the Appendix.  In summary, between 1965 and 1992, these holdings 
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are virtually non-existent.  After 1992, these holdings are largely complete, although there are 
several missing volumes. The librarian at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies stated that 
if they don’t receive a copy, they contact the supplier, ‘we are not always successful and we 
do not always know the reason why’.100  If these law libraries, on the FCO distribution list, 
don’t have the legislation, how can anyone be expected to access it?  In response to 
complaints about the lack of Gazettes at these libraries, the FCO replied ‘the material you 
request should be in the public domain (even if for reasons beyond the control of present 
members of the BIOT Administration it is not)’.101 
There are few non-governmental sources of BIOT Orders.  Westlaw has none of the key 
BIOT Orders.  Lexisnexis is only marginally better.  Raworth’s Constitutions of 
Dependencies and Territories lists 3 Orders, but the 2002 edition doesn’t have the key 1965 
Order or the 1971 Immigration Ordinance.102  The top ranked Google search result for the 
2004 Order gives a text which has spelling and grammatical mistakes as well as missing out a 
section.  It has only been through making personal contact with the legal team for the 
Chagossians that I was eventually able to get a full list of the statutes. 
Even Parliament cannot ensure they have proper access to BIOT legislation.  The FCO had 
previously indicated that they would send draft copies to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs Committee in advance of them being made.  However, no draft copies of the 2004 
Order were sent to the Committee.  The Secretary of State for the FCO attempted to justify 
this to the Committee – ‘we needed to preserve complete confidentiality if we were to avoid 
the risk of an attempt by the Chagossians to circumvent the Orders before they came into 
force’.103   
By way of historical comparison, access to legislation was much better before BIOT was 
detached from Mauritius.  Colonial Government v Vitry (1899) concerned the promulgation 
of an 1898 Ordinance.104  The Ordinance was published in the Official Gazette and also in 
eight newspapers.  The court held that this ‘was sufficient publication under our law, and 
consequently, that this Ordinance came into force on the last mentioned day and hour [of the 
final publication]’.105 
 
It could be thought that the lack of official promulgation of this legislation is accidental.  
However, it is clear that official government policy is to make the BIOT legislation 
inaccessible.  The Secretary of State sent a confidential telegram to the Governor of the 
Seychelles on the subject of what was to become the Immigration Ordinance 1971.  In 
paragraph 3 he stated ‘our concern is that publication of Ordinance and any regulations 
thereunder should be limited to minimum by law so as to attract as little attention as 
possible’.106  The Governor responded ‘Ordinance would be published in BIOT Gazette 
which has only very limited circulation both here and overseas after signature by 
Commissioner.  Publicity will therefore be minimal’.107 
Other prerogative legislation is equally difficult to track down.  The legislation governing the 
Northern Ireland Civil Service is the Civil Service Commissioners (Northern Ireland) Order 
1999 as amended in 2003 and 2007.  It is extremely difficult to access an up to date version 
of the 1999 Order.  In fact, it is extremely difficult to even find out that there is an Order and 
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that it was amended in 2003 and 2007.  The Commissioners don’t publish all the Orders.  The 
official government websites don’t have them.  The official government printers and 
newspapers of record don’t have them.  Commercial databases don’t have them.  
 
Whether deliberate or accidental, it is well nigh impossible to access authentic copies of 
BIOT legislation and this makes the legislation fundamentally bad law.  Millennia ago 
Suetonius wrote the following of Caligula’s laws 
 
These taxes being imposed, but the act by which they were levied never submitted to 
public inspection, great grievances were experienced from the want of sufficient 
knowledge of the law.  At length, on the urgent demands of the Roman people, he 
published the law, but it was written in a very small hand and posted up in a corner so 
that no one could make a copy of it.108  
 
In the internet age, publication via the Gazette is the equivalent to written in a very small 
hand and posted up in a corner. 
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Chapter 4 – Use of Prerogative Powers to Make 
Legislation 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the 2004 Order is void as it goes beyond the prerogative powers 
to enact legislation.  I begin by elucidating the source of the prerogative to legislate.  I then 
set out five separate reasons why the exercise of this power is void. 
Firstly, the nature of the power is to legislate for peace, order and good government of the 
territory.  Exiling the inhabitants cannot be said to be for this purpose.  Secondly, the 
prerogative is a creature of precedent and can only be used in a particular fashion if there is a 
precedent for it having been so used in the past.  No such precedent exists.  Thirdly, the 
prerogative is a residual power and cannot subsist if Parliament has already legislated upon a 
subject.  Parliament has already so legislated and therefore the prerogative is in abeyance.  
Fourthly, the prerogative power to legislate for a conquered territory ends when that territory 
receives a legislative assembly of its own.  The establishment of the Mauritian assembly 
ended the power to legislate.  Finally, according to the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, 
prerogative powers cannot be used to legislate in a way which is repugnant to an Act of 
Parliament.  The 2004 Order is repugnant both to Magna Carta and the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
These safeguards have been developed over the centuries by both courts and Parliament.  
They represent a defence against the capricious exercise of executive power untrammelled by 
democratic scrutiny.   
Source of Prerogative Power 
The Lord Chancellor defined prerogative power as the power ‘to exercise authority in the 
name of the Monarch without the people and their elected representatives in Parliament being 
consulted’.109  Its historical justification could prove slightly embarrassing for modern 
democrats.  Writing in 1680 Sir Robert Filmer stated that ‘I have endeavoured to show the 
natural institution of regal authority, and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of 
the people’.110  Although all prerogative powers are nominally exercised by the Crown, Dicey 
states that prerogative acts ‘though carried out in the King’s name, are in truth wholly the acts 
of the Ministry’.111   
The Public Administration Committee in the House of Commons listed many prerogative 
powers, including: making treaties, conducting diplomacy, deployment of armed forces, grant 
of pardons etc.112  Perreau-Sausinne thinks that even ‘English constitutional lawyers disagree 
on what these rules are’.113  Turpin argues that ‘a strong case can be made for replacing all 
the rather ill-defined and wide-ranging powers that currently rest on the prerogative with a 
statutory code’.114 
Prerogative legislation is one of the most important remaining prerogative powers. It is made 
by the Crown on the advice of the Privy Council (a body made up of senior government and 
establishment figures) but without the involvement of Parliament.  Prerogative legislation is 
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increasingly uncommon and indeed anachronistic. 115  Historically it has been used for 
diverse purposes.  For example, economic warfare in the First World War116 and to 
requisition ships in the Falklands War.117  It was used to regulate the Civil Service in England 
and Wales.  It is still used to regulate the Northern Ireland Civil Service, although this is 
under pressure from the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Bill currently before the Northern 
Ireland Assembly.  Poole describes it as the ‘black sheep’ of the constitutional fold as the 
prerogative is ‘far removed from the modern archetype of legitimate lawmaking’.118   
The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 sought to remove many prerogative 
powers and replace them with fully democratic ones (for example putting the Civil Service on 
a statutory footing).  Warbrick notes that there was nothing in that Act to remove prerogative 
powers in relation to colonies, and with specific reference to Diego Garcia finds this ‘a 
particularly troublesome conclusion in the light of the way the power has sometimes been 
used in the past’.119 
For the purposes of this essay, the most important prerogative power to enact legislation is 
the power to legislate for colonies.  Even this is fading.  According to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, only Gibraltar and BIOT are now governed by the prerogative, all other Overseas 
Territories are governed by statutes subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.120   
Holdsworth makes a critical distinction on the nature of legislative power depending upon 
whether the territory was settled, or whether it was conquered or ceded.  In settled territories 
‘the colonists had all the constitutional rights of Englishmen’.121  This meant that, as 
explained in Blankard v Galdy (1696) ‘all laws in force in England are in force there’,122 ie 
they were subject to the rule of Parliament, not to the rule of the Crown under the 
prerogative.  However, in the case of conquered or ceded territories, the Crown has full 
prerogative powers to legislate.  The key case of Campbell v Hall (1774) explained that ‘the 
King has a right to a legislative authority over a conquered country’.123  Roberts-Wray agrees 
with this distinction between settled and conquered / ceded territory.124 
Although there may be an historical reason for treating settled and conquered territory 
differently, it is harder to see a moral one.  Why should Chagossians be subject to 
unscrutinised prerogative legislation simply because Mauritius was ceded from the French in 
1814 rather than being settled by the British in 1814?  Tomkins argues that the law should not 
be dependent on such ‘ancient and formal niceties’.125 
 
Nature, Extent and Justiciability of Legislative Prerogative Power 
It is accepted on all sides that there is a prerogative power to legislate for conquered 
territories.  What then is its nature and extent?  Is this power justiciable?  It is submitted that 
the nature of the power is a power to legislate for the peace, order and good governance of 
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the territory.  It is submitted that this power is limited, not absolute.  Finally, it is submitted 
that the power is justiciable. 
 
Nature of Power 
Determining the nature of the power is not easy.  Prerogative power by definition, exists 
beyond statutory power.  However, prerogative legislation and case law do provide some 
assistance. 
In s. 15(1) of the 2004 Order, the following power is reserved to the Crown ‘to make laws for 
the peace, order and good government of the Territory’.  The same formulation appears in s. 
19 of the 1965 Order and s. 15 of the British Overseas Territory Order 1976.  Parliaments in 
Northern and Southern Ireland were originally given power ‘to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government’ (although this relates to power of a legislature rather than the 
prerogative).126  Section 2 of the British Settlements Act 1887 gave the Crown power to make 
laws ‘for the peace, order and good government of Her Majesty’s subjects’. It is submitted 
that the repetition of this mantra indicates that this is the definition of the prerogative power 
to legislate. 
This view is in accordance with the judicial view.  Carswell states that ‘the orders had to be 
laws made for the peace, order and good government of the colony’127 and Bingham 
agrees.128  Mance states that ‘the British Settlements Act 1887 suggests that this phrase 
reflects the generally understood nature of such powers’.129  Elliot and Perreau-Sausine go so 
far as arguing that the existence of a purpose for which such powers must be exercised means 
that prerogative orders are secondary rather than primary legislation.130  I think this fails to 
appreciate the status of prerogative legislation as ‘original’ in the sense that it is made as of 
right, rather than being delegated legislation dependent upon a primary statute to give it 
authority. 
 
Extent of Power 
The orthodox view was set out by Hoffman in Bancoult (2) when he said that ‘the words 
“peace, order and good government” have never been construed as words limiting the power 
of a legislature’.131  Union Steamship Co of Australia v King makes the same point ‘a power 
to make laws for the peace, order and good government of a territory is as ample and plenary 
power as the power possessed by the Imperial power itself.  That is, the words “peace, order 
and good government” are not words of limitation’.132 
Several other authorities are in line with this.  In R v Burah 133 it was held that the Indian 
Parliament had plenary powers of legislation.  In Hodge v R 134 it was held that the Ontario 
Parliament had authority as plenary as the Imperial Parliament.  In Ibralebbe v R135 it was 
held that powers for peace, order and good government connoted the widest lawmaking 
powers appropriate to a sovereign. 
Running through all these cases is the notion of plenary power, ie full power to legislate.  
However, the critical distinction to be made is between ‘plenary’ and ‘absolute’.  The 
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minority strand of jurisprudence argues that the power is not absolute, but limited.  In a 
second Australian case, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales ruled that peace, order and 
good government does not  
 
confer unlimited legislative power … The words, by their very terms, confine the 
powers conferred to “peace, welfare and good government” … The words convey 
plenary or sovereign power [but] does not necessarily import that the power is 
unlimited in scope.136 
 
The Divisional Court in Bancoult (1) found this reasoning persuasive.  It ruled that 
 
The “peace, order and good government” of any territory means nothing, surely, save 
by reference to the territories population.  They are to be governed not removed … I 
cannot see how the wholesale removal of a people from the land where they belong 
can be said to conduce to the territory’s peace, order and good government.137 
 
Sales, counsel for the Crown in Bancoult (1), indicated that he thought this too narrow a 
definition.138  However, in Bancoult (2) the Court of Appeal agreed with the limitation, ‘by 
exiling the population it has sought to do something which not only does not relate to the 
peace, the order or the good government of the Chagos Islands but which is antithetical to 
those ends’.139  Calvert, writing in the context of legislative competence for the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland is of the same opinion.140  Although in the constitutional cases of Gallagher 
v Lynn,141 Ulster Transport Authority v James Brown 142 and Duffy v Minister of Labour and 
National Insurance143 no argument was raised on the extent of peace, order and good 
government, this does not mean that the power is limitless.  Calvert states that ‘it is plain that 
he [Lord MacDermott in Duffy] is not using the word “general” here as synonymous with 
either “comprehensive” or “limitless” ’.144 
It is submitted that basic logic means that the power is limited.  In order to grant an absolute 
power, simply draft that ‘a person may do X’.  In order to grant a limited power, draft that ‘a 
person can do X for Y purposes’.  The absolutist view requires the words ‘power to legislate 
for peace, order and good government of the territory’ to actually mean ‘power to legislate’.    
This is a logical fallacy and presupposes that all the previously cited definitions of 
prerogative power are simply verbiage.  Unsurprisingly, courts take the view that legislative 
words are used for a purpose and are not verbiage.  Bennion writes that ‘it is to be presumed 
that (except so far as the contrary is evident) that  it [the enactment] was competently 
drafted’.145  The courts agree ‘words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly 
and not loosely and inexactly’.146 
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The majority of the House of Lords in Bancoult (2) made a further fundamental mistake in 
interpreting the power to legislate for peace, order and good government of the Territory.  
This was to ignore the element of ‘of the Territory’.  As argued above, these words were 
deliberately inserted and therefore must be interpreted as having a meaning.  However, 
Hoffman stated that the Crown ‘will act in the interests of her undivided realm’.147  In fact, 
under the government’s case, the Crown could also act in the defence interests of its close 
ally the US.  So the words ‘of the Territory’ are mangled to mean ‘of the Territory, or of any 
other territories governed by the Crown, or any other territory governed by an ally of the 
Crown’. 
Twomey disagrees, arguing that in advising the Crown on its powers over colonial territories, 
the UK Ministers were entitled to take into account the UK’s interests.148 Finnis agrees with 
Twomey arguing that prerogative legislation must be made in the interests of the UK and its 
dependencies as a whole, rather than the interest of the colony in question.149  I disagree.  
Although this constitutional theory may work in some places, faced with the express words of 
‘peace, order and good government of the territory’, it cannot stand. 
The dissenting judgement of Lord Atkins in Liversidge v Anderson also concerned a point of 
statutory interpretation where the government sought to construe the words of a statute to the 
detriment of an individual’s liberty: 
 
I protest, even if I do it alone, against a strained construction put on words with the 
effect of giving an uncontrolled power of imprisonment to the Minister.  To 
recapitulate: The words only have one meaning … I know of only one authority 
which might justify the suggested method of construction.  ‘When I use a word’ 
Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone ‘it means just what I choose it to mean, 
neither more nor less.’150 
 
Swap ‘exile’ for ‘imprisonment’ and the same reasoning applies equally to Bancoult (2).  
Section 9 of the 2004 Order is void as exiling the inhabitants of a territory goes far beyond 
legislating for the peace, order and good government of the territory. 
 
Justiciability of Power  
Can the courts adjudicate upon the validity of prerogative legislative powers?  Once again, 
there is a split in the jurisprudence.  All judges in the House of Lords in Bancoult (2) ruled 
that the exercise of prerogative legislative powers was subject to judicial review.  This flowed 
from previous case law which ruled that executive prerogative powers were amenable to 
judicial review.151  McBride welcomed this as an important step in establishing legal control 
over prerogative powers.152  However, the split occurs in considering whether the courts can 
undertake a substantive review of the merits of the legislation to see if it is actually for peace, 
order and good government.153  Daly describes this as the ‘political question’ doctrine.154 
Lord Hoffman ruled that, once an Order was established as formally correct, the courts 
couldn’t enquire into whether its objects could be said to be peace, order and good 
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government.155  In Riel v R it was held that peace, order and good government connoted ‘the 
utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects pointed to’.156  The crux of 
this point is the division of power between judges, the legislature and the executive.  Where 
parliament has properly passed a law, judges are loathe to overturn it on its merits.  In the 
House of Lords it was stated that ‘the sanction for inappropriate use of legislative power is 
political, not judicial’.157  As Calvert said 
 
Legislatures, by and large, behave responsibly and even if they did not, it would be a 
brave court which would abrogate to itself a competence in judgement superior to that 
of the elected representatives of the people on the question of what constitutes ‘good 
government’.158 
 
There are two key points in response to this.  Firstly, Lord Rodger said that ‘the policy was, 
precisely, to trust the legislatures and to leave control not to the courts, but to the legislatures 
and, ultimately, to the electorates, both at home and, where appropriate, in the colony 
concerned’.159  But the 2004 Order was made by neither Parliament nor a colonial legislature, 
but by the executive.  There is no democratic legitimacy available to be usurped by a judge.  
In any event, as Vaughan points out, ruling the 2004 Order void doesn’t prevent the 
government from achieving its objectives by other means, such as an Act of Parliament.160  
There is precedent, the Vagabonds Act 1597 exiled incorrigible and dangerous rogues and 
Irish, Scotch and Manx beggars.  
Secondly, where there are words of limitation, judges are obliged to enquire if the limitation 
has been breached.  This does not require a judge to ask ‘is this law a good idea?’ but ‘does 
this law comply with its legal pre-requisites?’  As Sedley LJ said in the Court of Appeal ‘it is 
[the court’s] constitutional function to decide whether what has been enacted is … rationally 
and legally capable of providing for a colony’s well being’.161  Elliot and Perreau-Saussine 
agree, arguing that such an enquiry ‘hardly requires judicial engagement with the minutiae of 
the decision or making of fine judgements’.162 
The final point to be made in this section relates to judicial deference to executive decisions.  
Ginsburg regards ‘constitutional review by courts as one safeguard against oppressive 
government’.163  Comella analysed judicial deference, ‘a court is deferent towards parliament 
when it interprets the constitution in a way that is close to the interpretation implicitly relied 
upon by parliament’.164  One conclusion he drew was that a constitutional court was less 
likely to be deferential.  The House of Lords is not a classed as a constitutional court.  
Judicial deference is clear from the historical analysis carried out by Swinfen.165  He quotes a 
UK civil servant as saying that ‘but in practice the tendency has long been to consider 
Colonial Legislatures as legally competent to pass almost any law’.166  Elliot and Perreau-
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Saussine think that ‘a measure of unnecessary and obfuscatory deference lives on in relation 
to the prerogative merely because it is the prerogative’.167 
Lord Atkins thought this wrong – ‘I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a 
mere question of construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the 
subject show themselves more executive minded than the executive’.168 
 
Precedent for Exercise of Prerogative 
In the Case of Proclamations the King sought to enforce his will by the issue of Royal 
Proclamations.169  The court held that ‘The King hath no prerogative, but that which the law 
of the land allows him’.170  The same point was made in Entick v Carrington ‘if it is law, it 
will be found in our books.  If it is not to be found there, it is not law’.171  The court ruled in 
BBC v Johns172 that  the prerogative cannot be enlarged.  These historical cases reflect the 
long power struggle between Crown and Parliament, with Parliament ever trying to curtail the 
power of an absolute monarch. 
In recent times Lord Reid stated that 
 
The prerogative is really a relic of a past age, not lost by disuse, but only available for 
a case not covered by statute.  So I would think that the proper approach is a historical 
one:  how was it used in former times and how has it been used in modern times?173 
 
The modern statement of this principle is given by Bingham in Bancoult (2) when he said that 
‘the courts must conduct a historical enquiry to ascertain whether there is any precedent for 
the exercise of the power in the given circumstances’.174 
What then is the historical precedent for a provision like s. 9 of the 2004 Order exiling a 
population from its homeland?  Turning first to the case law, I have found no case suggesting 
that a person can be exiled by the prerogative.  All I have found is cases stating the opposite.  
Coke cites two cases on exile.175  The King ordered Belknap to serve as a judge in Ireland.  
The King also ordered Sir Richard Pembrugh to serve as his deputy in Ireland.  In both cases 
Coke found the orders unlawful.  Fabrigas v Mostyn concerned prerogative power in Minorca 
in the 18th century.176  Minorca was ceded to the British.  Governor Mostyn sought to banish 
Fabrigas, but the court ruled that the prerogative could not be used in this way.  Forsyth 
considered whether Jesuits could be expelled from Maryland. 177   If they were aliens, they 
could, but ‘if they be her Majesty’s natural born subjects, they cannot be banished from her 
Majesty’s dominions’.178 
Turning next to the eminent commentaries on English law, again the power of the Crown to 
exile is prohibited.  Blackstone states that ‘But no authority on earth, except the authority of 
Parliament, can send any subject of England out of the land against his will, no not even a 
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criminal’.179  Holdsworth in his magisterial A History of the English Law agrees ‘The Crown 
has never had a prerogative power to prevent its subjects from entering the Kingdom, or to 
expel them from it’.180  Coke, who represents the mother lode of commentaries on English 
law said that  
 
By the law of the land no man can be exiled, or banished out of his native country, but 
either by authority of parliament, or in the case of abjuration for felony by the 
common law, and so when our books, or any record speaks of exile or banishment, 
other than in case of abjuration, it is intended to be done by authority of parliament.181 
 
The reference to abjuration should be explained.  It was an ancient right, related to the right 
of sanctuary.  A felon could flee to a church, confess and do penitence in sackcloth in front of 
a sheriff, then go to a port carrying a crucifix.  He would leave the realm, promising never to 
return, on pain of execution.  Unfortunately for Julian Assange, abjuration is no longer law in 
the UK. 
Craies carried out a detailed historical analysis entitled ‘The Compulsion of Subjects to 
Leave the Realm’.182  He concluded that there was no ‘royal claim to expel obnoxious 
subjects from the realm without trial and verdict; and subsequent attempts to bring people 
before the Royal Council were resisted and checked both in Plantagenet and Stuart times’.183 
This long-standing rule is related to the prohibition of exile in Magna Carta (see the next 
section).  But it is a fact that there is no prerogative power to banish.  As Lord Mance said ‘it 
would be surprising if any precedent could be found for such a provision, and none has been 
shown’.184  Bingham agreed.185 
There is no precedent for exile, section 9 cannot stand. 
 
Subservience of Prerogative Legislation to Parliamentary 
Legislation 
Prerogative legislation is inferior to parliamentary legislation.  It cannot exist if Parliament 
has  legislated on a subject.  The modern exposition of this was in Attorney General v De 
Keyser’s Royal Hotel.186  In that case, the government expropriated private property for 
military purposes.  If expropriation was carried out under the auspices of the statutory 
scheme, compensation was payable.  However, the government argued that expropriation was 
actually done under the royal prerogative for the defence of the realm and hence no 
compensation was payable.  The House of Lords ruled the government’s argument absurd – 
once Parliament has spoken, the government couldn’t rely upon the prerogative.  Lord 
Atkinson stated that once a statute is passed ‘it abridges the Royal Prerogative while it is in 
force to this extent: that the Crown can only do the particular thing in accordance with the 
statutory provisions, and that its prerogative power to do that thing is in abeyance’. 
The House of Lords advanced this principle further in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union.187  The court held the prerogative was in abeyance 
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even though the statutory scheme had never been brought into force.  Even though the 
statutory scheme was not actually a law yet, the fact that Parliament had spoken was enough 
to render the prerogative inoperable. 
One modern case does deflect this principle from its trajectory in favour of proper 
parliamentary powers as against unaccountable and opaque prerogative powers.  In R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Northumbria Police Authority188 the 
court ruled that a prerogative power to maintain peace and order subsisted alongside specific 
statutory powers authorising police authorities to provide the police with certain equipment.  
Bradley criticised the reasoning in this case.189  In my view it is out of step with the 
progressive conception of democratic constitutionalism.  Leigh also criticised the case 
arguing that  
 
An alternative, and far preferable, approach would have been a cautious reading of the 
prerogative wherever a statute arose in the same field, thus forcing the executive to 
claim from the legislature specific authority to preserve the prerogative power where 
necessary.190 
 
Harris considered the primacy of parliament so important that he argued that other non-
prerogative powers (‘third source powers’) should also be residual, ie that they only subsist in 
the absence of parliamentary legislation.191 
Regardless of these nuances, it is clear and it was accepted in Bancoult (2) that the 
prerogative is subservient to Parliamentary legislation.  The relevant question is then, has 
Parliament legislated in this field such that the prerogative is in abeyance? 
In my view, the answer to this question is categorically yes.  Chapter 29 of Magna Carta 1215 
reads 
 
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned … or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed … 
but by the lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land. 
 
Magna Carta is the cornerstone of the British constitution and one of the most important 
documents in the struggle for democracy and civil liberties.  Bingham cites it as his first 
milestone of the rule of law.  He says that it ‘expressed a clear rejection of unbridled, 
unaccountable royal power, an assertion that even the supreme power in the state must be 
subject to certain overriding rules’.192   
Magna Carta states that exile is prohibited.  Parliament (or at least its 1215 predecessor) has 
spoken.  The prerogative power to exile is in abeyance.  Two counter-arguments can be 
suggested.  Firstly, that exile is acceptable if authorised ‘by the law of the land’ ie under 
section 9 of the 2004 Order.  Secondly that Magna Carta doesn’t extend to BIOT.   
Although superficially attractive, the first counter-argument fails on closer inspection.  
Magna Carta was all about restricting the power of King John from riding roughshod over the 
rights of the Barons (the rights of the people were a later consideration).  It was an attempt to 
limit royal power.  It would be perverse to construe it as being subject to royal power.  If the 
‘law of the land’ includes ‘the prerogative power to legislate’ then the protection of Magna 
Carta is a phantasm.  It is nonsensical to say that King John can’t exile a person unless King 
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John exercises his prerogative power to exile the person.  The ‘law of the land’ must mean a 
properly enacted law with democratic legitimacy separate from Crown powers.   
Coke agrees with this analysis.  He defines the original Latin version of ‘per legem terrae’ as 
meaning ‘that is, by the Common Law, Statute Law or Custom of England’.193  He goes on to 
say that no-one can be imprisoned ‘by petition or suggestion to the King, or to his 
Council’.194  As quoted in the previous section, Coke’s firm view is that exile was only 
possible under an Act of Parliament. 
The second counter-argument fails as there is express legislative provision applying Magna 
Carta to BIOT.  Firstly, section 3 of the Courts Ordinance 1983195 states that, in relation to 
BIOT, ‘the law to be applied as part of the law of the Territory shall be the law of England as 
from time to time in force in England’.  There are some caveats to this provision, but none 
which would displace the application of Magna Carta.  Secondly, the creation of BIOT in 
1965 did not wipe out all previous laws in force under the Mauritian legal system.  S. 15(1) of 
the 1965 Order states that all previous laws remain in force post-creation of BIOT.  In both 
the 1884 and 1947 Digests of Mauritian Law there are several references to the remedy of 
habeas corpus being available in Mauritius.  This remedy has long been regarded as 
stemming from Magna Carta.  Therefore, as Magna Carta was in force in Mauritius pre-1965, 
it remained in force in BIOT post-1965.  The government initially argued in Bancoult (1) that 
Magna Carta didn’t extend to BIOT, but they subsequently resiled from this position.  All the 
judges in Bancoult (2) regarded Magna Carta as applying in BIOT.  Lord Rodger ruled that ‘I 
proceed on the basis that [Magna Carta] applies and that no-one can be exiled from BIOT but 
by the law of the land’.196 
If Magna Carta isn’t regarded as sufficient to put the prerogative in abeyance, then the 
Human Rights Act 1998 should.  The Act incorporated the terms of the European Convention 
on Human Rights into British law.  The Convention protects the rights to liberty, security and 
private and family life.  Exile is anathema to these rights.  Parliament has spoken on this 
subject, therefore the prerogative is in abeyance and section 9 of the 2004 Order has no 
authority. 
The counter-argument to this is the same as that for Magna Carta – that the Human Rights 
Act 1998 doesn’t extend to BIOT.  Article 56 of the Convention says that a state may make a 
declaration to extend the Convention to any territory for whose international relations it is 
responsible.  The UK government made a declaration on 23 October 1953 that the 
Convention extended to Mauritius.  It made a further declaration on 12 June 1969 that, in 
view of its independence, the extension to Mauritius lapsed.  The declaration made on 30 
June 1969 does not include BIOT in the list of territories to which the Convention extends.  
Lord Hoffman agreed with this counter-argument holding that the Convention ‘applies to a 
political entity and not to the land which is from time to time comprised in its territory.  
BIOT has since 1965 been a new political entity to which the Convention has never been 
extended’.197 
My response is that Lord Hoffman and the counter-argument are wrong for both a broad and 
a narrow reason.  The broad reason is that it is constitutionally unrealistic to wipe the statute 
book clean and start with a blank page whenever there is accession, secession or partition 
leading to a constitutional or territorial change to a state.  When Northern Ireland separated 
from the Republic of Ireland in 1920, the previous laws in force did not simply disappear 
overnight – they remained in force.  Section 61 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 
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replicated the analogous provisions of s. 15 of the 1965 Order – all laws in force immediately 
before partition / secession remained in force afterwards.  Obliterating the statute book upon 
territorial or constitutional change is a recipe for anarchy.  It can’t realistically be argued that 
BIOT was, immediately upon its creation, a land without laws. 
The narrow reason for rejecting this counter-argument is that the various declarations made 
by the UK government don’t in fact remove the application of the Convention to BIOT.  
When the first declaration was made extending the Convention to Mauritius, the term 
‘Mauritius’ included the Chagos Islands.  When the declaration was made withdrawing 
Mauritius from the Convention’s ambit, it was because Mauritius was independent.  But that 
‘Mauritius’ did not include BIOT as BIOT had not attained independence.  Therefore, the 
initial extension of the Convention to BIOT has never been withdrawn from BIOT. 
There is a completely separate reason why the Convention applies to BIOT and therefore why 
the prerogative is in abeyance.  Article 1 of the Convention states that ‘The High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention’ (my emphasis).  This is a free-standing ground for application 
of the Convention.  By definition, BIOT is within the jurisdiction of the UK – the UK has 
complete executive, legislative and judicial control of the territory.  Therefore there is an 
obligation to comply with the Convention.  The effectiveness of Article 1 was accepted by 
the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ocalan v Turkey.198 In that case, Turkish 
forces took Ocalan into their custody in Kenya.  The court nevertheless held that Art 1 was 
engaged as Ocalan was within their jurisdiction even though he was thousands of miles from 
Turkey.  In R (Al Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence the House of Lords ruled on this 
point.199  They found that the fact that a person was in the custody of British soldiers in Iraq 
meant that Art 1 of the Convention and also the Human Rights Act 1998 was engaged. 
In dealing with an analogous international treaty, Capps makes similar points to those I have 
made above.  He argues that the UK cannot disclaim responsibility for BIOT under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as any reservation purporting to exclude 
BIOT would be invalid.200 
 
Extinguishment of Prerogative upon Establishment of Colonial 
Legislative Assembly 
The specific power of the Crown to legislate for conquered territories can also be 
extinguished by the establishment of a legislative assembly in that territory.  Wray states that 
‘if the Crown grants to a conquered territory a representative legislative body, without 
reserving to itself the power to legislate, that power is no longer exercisable’.201  This was the 
precise ratio in the seminal case of Campbell v Hall.  That case concerned Grenada, 
conquered in 1762 and ceded to the British in 1763.  The King established a parliament there 
and then subsequently attempted to impose a tax.  The court ruled that he had no power to do 
so.  Holdsworth explained the ratio as follows 
 
Though the King had power to levy such a duty by his prerogative in a conquered 
colony, he had, by the grant of representative institutions, put Grenada into the 
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position of a settled colony; with the result that such a duty could only be imposed 
either by an Act of the Assembly or by Act of Parliament.202 
 
The Privy Council followed this ruling in Re Lord Bishop of Natal.203  That case concerned 
the prerogative power to create a new bishopric in South Africa.  The Court held that  
 
After the establishment of an independent legislature in the Settlements of the Cape of 
Good Hope and Natal, there was no power in the Crown by virtue of its Prerogative 
[to establish a bishopric] … After a colony or settlement has received legislative 
institutions the Crown … stands in the same relation to that colony or settlement as it 
does to the United Kingdom.204 
 
The unanswered question is whether the prerogative power is extinguished in these 
circumstances, or is merely in abeyance ready to be revived when needed.  Like most 
questions about vague and uncodified prerogative powers, it is hard to be canonical with the 
answer.  In my opinion, democratic power is incompatible with royal power and if the Crown 
has given away its right to legislate, it cannot subsequently take it back.  It could be argued 
that this creates a legislative vacuum if a local legislature is prorogued and no prerogative 
power remains.  However, the vacuum can very easily be filled by relying on the superior 
power of Parliament to legislate for the territory. 
This argument can then be applied to the Chagos Islands.  According to Matthew Lange, 
Mauritius has had a Council of Government since 1825.205  He described it as the ‘official 
legislative branch of the colony’.206  In 1947 the Council became the Legislative Assembly 
with 12 members appointed by the Governor and 19 elected.  In 1958, 40 members were 
elected by universal suffrage. 
It is therefore indisputable that the Crown ceded its prerogative legislative powers to the 
Mauritius Legislative Assembly and that, before detachment in 1965,  that Assembly had 
power to legislate for the Chagos Islands.  Therefore, it is submitted that the prerogative 
power to legislate for BIOT expired.  Once expired, it could not then be revived in 1965.  
However, this argument runs into difficulties if the establishment of the local legislature 
could be construed as including a reservation preserving the prerogative power.  There is also 
an argument that the Crown always retains a prerogative power to alter a colony’s 
constitution. 
 
Repugnancy of Colonial Legislation to English Law 
One of the key rulings in Campbell v Hall was that the Crown ‘cannot make any new change 
contrary to fundamental principles’ of English law.207  This established a principle that 
colonial laws (including those made by the prerogative) would be void if repugnant to the 
fundamental principles of English law.  For example, the court in Fabrigas v Mostyn 
considered whether torture could be used in Minorca and ruled that it couldn’t – ‘the 
constitution of this country put an end to that idea’.208  Jenkyns wrote that ‘any laws contrary 
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to the fundamental principles of English law, eg torture, banishment or slavery are ipso facto 
abrogated’.209 
In some ways, this is a laudable principle and the courts could have developed a list of 
‘fundamental principles’.  However, in practice the principle was too vague and caused 
uncertainty.  Finnis quotes colonial lawyers stating that it would be impossible to lay down 
rules to distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental English laws.  Holdsworth 
said that it ‘left it quite uncertain what laws could be deemed to be fundamental’.210  Things 
came to a head in the Australian case of McEllister v Fenn211  where the judge called into 
question the validity of large swathes of colonial legislation.  The Parliament of South 
Australia launched an enquiry.212  Whilst recognising a theoretical problem with lack of 
precision, their view was that ‘no practical difficulty was likely to arise from the doctrine of 
repugnancy because it was unlikely that the legislature would pass, or the Governor or the 
Crown would sanction, a law repugnant to fundamental principles’.213 
Nevertheless, the Imperial Parliament decided to act to prevent this problem arising again.  
They did so by passing the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865.  This replaced the vague 
‘repugnant to fundamental principles of English law’ with the more concrete ‘repugnant to an 
Act of Parliament’.  Keith stated that ‘the essential feature of this measure is that it abolished 
once and for all the vague doctrine of repugnancy to the principles of English law as a source 
of invalidity of any Act’.214  The court in Liyanage v R confirmed that the Act did not leave in 
existence ‘a fetter of repugnancy to some vague unspecified law of natural justice’.215 
Professor Finnis agreed, ‘its purpose will have been to abolish the whole repugnancy doctrine 
in Campbell v Hall’.216  
Although some of the other judges in Bancoult (2) did mention fundamental principles, it is 
submitted that Lord Rodger was correct in his analysis that the doctrine had been superseded 
by the 1865 Act.  To use Finnis’ colourful phrase, it isn’t enough if a colonial law falls within 
a parade of horibilia, it will only be void if repugnant to an Act of Parliament.217 
What then is the scheme of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865? In s. 1 it defines colonial 
law to include laws passed by colonial legislatures as well as laws passed under the 
prerogative. It also provides that an Act of Parliament extends to a colony either by express 
words or necessary intendment.  Section 2 is the key provision, it states that a colonial law is 
void if it is repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to a colony.  S. 3 
nails the lid on the coffin of the ‘fundamental principles’ principle by saying that s. 2 is the 
only ground for repugnancy.  The Act is straightforward and was effective.   
It only remains to apply it to the 2004 Order.  It is here that I part company with Lord 
Rodger.  For the reasons expounded upon in the previous section, it is my contention that 
both Magna Carta and the Human Rights Act apply in BIOT.  Banishment is repugnant to 
both these statutes.  Therefore, s. 9 of the 2004 Order is void. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
The Chagossians were exiled from their homeland by prerogative legislation – legislation 
made, not by a legislature but by the executive.  I have sought to show that the 2004 Order is 
bad law because it is of low quality, is inaccessible and is ultra vires. 
 
I have shown that the 2004 Order is of low quality when measured by Xanthaki’s criteria.  It 
is not clear, precise or unambiguous.  It is not written in gender neutral or plain language.  Its 
title is disingenuous.   
If the Order had been made as an Act of Parliament, it is submitted that most of these defects 
would have been removed. It would have been drafted by trained legislative counsel familiar 
with the principles of sound legislative drafting.  Proper scrutiny would have improved 
quality. It would correctly have been entitled the Chagos Islands (Exile) Act. 
I have shown that the inaccessibility of the 2004 Order seriously undermines its legitimacy.  
Accessibility is fundamental to the legality of a law.  A law which is only accessible by 
literally trawling through dusty shelves in the basement of a London law library is not a good 
law.  If the law had been made properly, rather than by the prerogative, accessibility would 
have vastly improved.  It would be on the statute book, on Parliament’s website, on the 
official legislation website and available on multiple databases.  Cohn states that prerogative 
orders are ‘less visible and accessible and provide a weaker basis for accountability and 
review processes’.218  It is hard to argue with her view that this is precisely what makes this 
mode of law-making attractive to government. 
I have shown that there is no prerogative power to make legislation of this sort.  Exile cannot 
be said to promote peace, order and good governance and there is no precedent for its use.  In 
fact, it goes against fundamental legislation such as Magna Carta and the Human Rights Act 
1998.  If the Order had instead been made by Parliament, then these objections on vires 
would have largely fallen away.  Sovereignty of Parliament means that Parliament is largely 
free to legislate as it please (although there still could be human rights challenges). 
 
Although the 2004 Order may be the nadir of bad law, I have shown that other prerogative 
legislation also suffers from defects in terms of quality and accessibility.  As Cohn 
summarises, prerogative legislation allows government to make laws ‘without passing the 
cumbersome legislative process, to design and apply rules without necessarily publishing 
them, thereby evading subjection to accountability mechanisms’.219  Moules also attacks 
prerogative legislation on this ground, as an attempt by the executive to deny parliamentary 
and judicial scrutiny simply by choosing a particular mode of enactment.220 
 
Parliamentarians have turned their minds to this issue and have spoken clearly against the 
policy.  Discussing the Chagossians, Jeremy Corbyn MP said  
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‘The Prime Minister’s Office has inherited the power of the royal prerogative and this 
can and is used to bypass Parliament. It is high time that all prime ministerial 
decisions were brought under parliamentary scrutiny.’221 
As has been demonstrated in relation to the Chagos Islands, prerogative law-making is the 
paradigm of bad law-making.  In my opinion, this law is so fundamentally flawed, so 
oppressive and draconian that it should never have been made.   
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Appendix – Copies of BIOT Gazette in British Law Libraries 
 
 
Gazette Issue Institute of 
Advanced Legal 
Studies Library 
British 
Library 
Squire Law 
Library 
Cambridge 
University 
Library 
1965   Yes  Yes 
1966  Deficient    Yes 
1967     Yes 
1968      
1969      
1970      
1971      
1972      
1973      
1974      
1975      
1976      
1977      
1978      
1979      
1980      
1981      
1982   Yes   
1983      
1984      
1985      
1986      
1987      
1988      
1989      
1990      
1991      
1992   Yes   
1993  Yes Yes   
1994 1 Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
 3 Yes Yes   
 4  Yes   
1995 1 Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
1996 1 Yes Yes   
 2  Deficient   
1997 1 Yes Deficient    
 2 Yes Yes   
1998 1 Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
F1059 
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Gazette Issue Institute of 
Advanced Legal 
Studies Library 
British 
Library 
Squire Law 
Library 
Cambridge 
University 
Library 
 3 Yes Yes   
1999 1  Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
2000 1 Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
2001 1 Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
2002 1 Yes Yes   
 2  Deficient   
2003 1 Yes Yes   
 2  Deficient   
2004 1 Yes Yes   
 2 Yes Yes   
2005 1 Yes yes   
 2   Yes  
2006 1 Yes Yes Yes  
 2 Yes Yes Yes  
2007 1 Yes Yes Yes  
 2   Yes  
2008 1 Yes Yes Yes  
 2 Yes Yes Yes  
2009  Yes yes Yes  
2010   Yes Yes  
2011 1 Yes Claimed   
 2  Claimed   
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